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Abstract
The objective of this paper is twofold: rst, we construct and analyze a country-specic time-varying
private rental regulation index for 18 developed economies starting from 1973 till 2014. Second, we analyze
the eects of our rental regulation index on the housing rental markets across 18 countries and states.
Unlike the previous rent regulation indices in the literature, our index, which is based on the detailed
country reports, not only covers 18 developed economies over 42 years but also combines both tenure
security and rent laws. Our index covers the classic aspects of rst- and second-generation rent control
and helps to identify three dierent phases of rental market regulation for the past 42 years. Moreover,
our time-varying index sheds further insights on the extent to which rent and tenure security laws have
converged over the past forty years for each economies. Finally, using our new panel data on private
tenancy regulation index for 18 economies, we show three empirical results. First, very strict rent control
regimes do lead to lower real rent growth rates than regimes with free rents. Second, tenure security law
plays a statistically signicant role for the eects of second-generation rent control regimes on rents: soft
rent control regimes with time limited tenure security and minimum duration periods may cause higher
rent growth rates than free rent regimes. Third, the rent free regimes do not show signicant high real
rent appreciation rates. Instead, the rent data reveals that the mean real rent growth is statistically not
dierent than zero for the free rent regimes.
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1 Introduction
Recent public and political interests on rent control, for example, in the U.S. and Germany1 are
motivated in no small part by recent economic events such as the Financial and Housing cycles
(the Great Recession) and the Brexit. While this burgeoning recent public interest on rent control
continues to be debated by political factions and consumers, the general academic consensus on
the issue is clear: rent and eviction controls foster economic ineciencies ( e.g. Hayek (1972)
and Friedman and Stigler (1972)). Rent control often leads to lower housing quality, less new
constructions, shrinking rental markets, misallocations of living space or harmful immobility of
labour and thus to insucient distribution of labour throughout the economy.2 One of the reasons
for the continuous public debate, despite the economic theory, is due to various empirical results
that support both sides of the issue and the lack of comprehensive empirical analysis that is based
on a solid rent regulation data for the across regions and nations (see for example, Arnott (1995)
and Hubert (2003)). As a consequence, in the last thirty years, there are very few studies on the
eects of rent control that is based on a large time-variant cross-country rent regulation index.3
The objective of this paper is, consequently, twofold: rst, to construct and analyze a country-
specic time-varying private rent regulation index for 18 developed economies4 starting from
1973 till 2014; second, to analyze the eects of our panel rental regulation index on the housing
rental markets across 18 economies. Unlike the previous rent regulation indices in the literature,
our index, which is based on the detailed country (state) reports, not only covers 18 developed
economies over 42 years but also combines both tenure security and rent laws.5 Our index covers
1 In Germany, the so-called Mietpreisbremse was introduced in 2015 with the aim of barring landlords in property
hotspots from increasing rents by more than 10% above a local benchmark. And in the U.S., a recent as 2017, New
York City council panel approved rent increase for the regulated apartments (New York Time, 2017)
2 Along with the seminal works by Hayek (1972) and Friedman and Stigler (1972), there are other well established
works by, for example, Olsen (1969), Gyourko and Linneman (1990), Basu and Emerson (2000), and Munch and
Svarer (2002).
3 See, for example, Gstach (2010), Malpezzi and Ball (1993), Andrews et al. (2011), and Cuerpo et al. (2014))
4 Due to the data availability, we use both the country and the state level data in constructing our regula-
tion index. The countries and states are New South Wales (Australia), Austria, Ontario (Canada), Denmark,
United Kingdom, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, California (United States), Massachusetts (United States).
5 Using exactly the same framework and methodology as Weber (2017), Kholodilin (2018) is the only other
regulation index that extends Weber (2017) regulation index to include more countries and longer time periods.
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the classic aspects of rst- and second-generation rent control and helps to identify three dierent
phases of rental market regulation for the past 42 years. Moreover, our time-varying index sheds
further insights on the extent to which rent and tenure security laws have converged over the past
forty years for each countries. Finally, using our new panel data on private tenancy regulation
index for 18 economies, we show three empirical results. First, very strict rent control regimes
do lead to lower real rent growth rates than regimes with free rents. Second, tenure security law
plays a statistically signicant role for the eects of second-generation rent control regimes on
rents: soft rent control regimes with time limited tenure security and minimum duration periods
may cause higher rent growth rates than free rent regimes. Third, the rent free regimes do not
show signicant high real rent appreciation rates. Instead, the rent data reveals that the mean
real rent growth is statistically not dierent than zero for the free rent regimes.
The paper is structured as follows: it has two main sections. First section is on the measure
of our private rental market regulation index. In this section, we provide a short overview of the
recent economic literature on rental market regulation in dierent countries. We then describe
in detail the methodology in constructing our rental market regulation index and its two sub-
indices. Finally, we provide and analyze the time series properties of rent and tenure security
laws. In section two, we empirically analyze the eects of dierent rent control regimes such as
the rst-generation rent control and second-generation rent control regimes (Arnott 1995), using
our regulation index, on the development of real rents. Last section concludes with the Appendix
that contains each country regulation report in detail as well as other robust empirical tests.
2 On the Measure of Rental Market Regulation
This section deals with the country-specic regulation of private tenancies in 18 advanced economies
over the course of 42 years. On the basis of detailed country reports, we construct time-varying
rental market regulation index. The index is based on both rent laws and tenure security laws
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that cover the classic aspects of rst- and second-generation rent control.
On the basis of 18 regulation reports6, a set of ten dummies and three indices is constructed.
The panel gives a deep and broad overview of private tenancy law in advanced economies. Reg-
ulation that deal solely with public housing are, however, not considered here. The dataset
enables a thorough analysis of dierent regulation outcomes across the sample. Our time-variant
cross-country indices dier from others as most studies on private rental markets are based on
single-country levels.
2.1 Literature Review
Content and methodology of the private rental market regulation index follow the literature in
two separate elds. On the one hand, the recent literature on the dierent styles of rental market
regulation - especially rent control and tenure security - provide the basis for the content of the
index (Arnott 1995, 2003; Lind 2001; Hubert 1996). The number of studies about tenure security
is slim in comparison to the one addressing rent regulation. However, the presence of a certain
level of tenure security is essential for rent regulation to be eective (Arnott 1995, 2003; Lind
2001). Understandably, renters cherish a secure and familiar home (Arnott 1995). Therefore,
loose tenure security would put a negative eect on the value of rental dwellings, especially as
a substitute to home ownership. Whitehead et al. (2012) and Scanlon et al. (2011) state that
tenure security plays a signicant role for rental market regulation. Whitehead et al. (2012) nd
that countries with a regulation that balances the interest of both landlords and tenants may help
developing bigger and better functioning rental markets. Scanlon et al. (2011) state that two
main factors responsible for a more attractive private rental market are a level of tenure security
and a country specic tradition towards renting rather than owning. Haner et al. (2008) draw
similar conclusions by comparing the rental market regulation of ve European countries. Boer
and Bitteti (2014) compare the private rental sector of four European countries. The regulation
6 Country reports are presented in the Appendix.
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of rents and the extent of tenure security are part of the study. They conclude that there is a
growing importance of the private rental sector policies for the outcome of housing markets and
therefore for the whole economy. Furthermore, two big research projects in the eld of international
law by the European University in Florence (Schmid 2009) and the University of Bremen7 give
detailed snapshots of private tenancy regulation in Europe. However, both projects remain solely
descriptive.
Andrews et al. (2011) are the rst to construct a broader indexation of rent regulation and
tenure security. Their time-invariant index consists of questionnaire of country experts and is a
snapshot of the regulation in 32 OECD countries. The index is divided into two areas: the security
of tenure and the regulation of rents. The two areas consist of ve sub-indices that cover rent level
control, rent increase control, deposit requirements, ease of tenant eviction and tenure security.
The authors show that tighter control comes together with lower homeownership rates and a lower
quality of rentals. The European Commission adopted the index for their own analysis (Cuerpo et
al. 2014) and adapted it for all members of the European Union. Their analysis showed, among
others, that tighter rent regulation can lead to stronger house price dynamics. Furthermore,
Kholdilin (2015) constructed an index of housing market regulation for Germany between 1913
and 2015.
Both the present and the past have seen many dierent regimes of rent and eviction control.
Thus, a clear classication of dierent rent control and tenure security regimes may help to nd
an adequate assessment of private tenancy regulation. One of the main contributions to the clas-
sication of rent control regimes is done by Arnott (1995, 2003) who classies rent control as rst-
and second-generation rent control regimes. According to Arnott (1995, 2003), rst-generation
rent control regimes are the strictest form of rent control such as nominal rent freezing. Second-
generation rent control regimes imply a softer rent control. These regimes usually allow rents to
be adjusted with consumer or cost price developments. A further form of second-generation rent
7 http://www.tenlaw.uni-bremen.de/introduction.html
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control regimes is known as tenancy rent control regimes. These regimes decontrol initial rents
while rent increases during the tenancy are bound to some sort of control. The classications
dened by Arnott (1995, 2003) are mainly used for the indexation of rent control. Lind (2001)
and Hubert (2003) also present some variations of these classications of rent control.
As far as the methodology of indexing is concerned, we follow the well-known legal origin
theory (La Porta et al. 1998 and 2008). For large country samples, the authors of the legal origin
theory extracted the regulation of dierent markets and sub-markets such as nance (La Porta et
al. 1998), labour markets (Botero et al. 2004) or private credit markets (Djankov et al. 2007).
In the past twenty years legal origins theory and criticisms (Deakin et al. 2007) thereof
contributed to uncovering the drivers and eects of dierent institutional outcomes throughout
the world. The legal origins theory was initially promoted by La Porta et al. (1998 and 2008).
According to this theory, the origins of legal systems such as the English common law8 and the
civil law in its French, German and Nordic variants inuence national regulatory styles. The legal
origins theory is used in the eld of company and nancial law (La Porta et al. 1998) as well
as to other markets such as labour markets (Botero et al. 2004), the regulation of private credit
markets (Djankov et al. 2007) or the burden of entry regulation (Djankov et al. 2002b) to mention
just a few. The legal origins theory predicts that civil law countries are associated with a stricter
regulation and a deeper government involvement than common law. Furthermore, the approach
claims that common law countries are more likely to produce ecient rules for the governance of
the business enterprise than countries with civil law origins (La Porta et al. 2008).
2.2 Methodology: Measuring rental Market Regulation
The dataset of this paper follows the leximetric approach. The construction of the rent law index,
the security of tenure index and the rental market regulation index follows the methodology that
is commonly used in legal origins studies. The empirical base for the legal origins approach are
8 Please note that English legal origin are named common law throughout this paper.
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multi-country datasets which measure the degree of regulation in particular areas of economic
activity. The coding procedures follow leximetric analyses that are a diligent quantication of
legal rules (Lele and Siems (2006), Deakin et al. (2007), and La Porta et al. (1998)). In other
words, the regulating strength of laws is measured by numerical value to the law in a particular
eld.
The dataset deals with two broad areas: rent law (rl) and tenure security law (tsl). Both areas
together represent the rental market regulation (rmr) index. The rmr index is the average of ten
dummies dealing with the legal statutes governing private tenancy contracts. They are described
in more detail further below. Each of the two areas of regulation form an index that measures
rent control or tenure security. The two indices are the average of their dummies. While the rent
law index consists of the rst six dummies (D1-D6), the tenure security index is the average of the
last four dummies (D7-D10). The dummy variables have two outcomes, `yes' and `no' or `1' and
`0', respectively. Therefore, the indices range between zero and one. An overview of the dummies
is given in Table1.
The indexation of law and regulation will always give an incomplete picture of reality (Deakin
et al. 2007). Therefore, the eort is to approach it as closely as possible. Due to simplicity
and transparency reasons, however, the rental market regulation index cannot take every critical
aspect into account. For example, dierent regulations that are tracked by the ten dummies may
vary in relevance across the countries, depending on the dierent roles they play in each system.
Therefore, not weighting every single variable of the index individually may cause a problem
(Deakin et al. 2007). The rental market regulation indices neglect this aspect since there is no
special weighting of the dierent dummies. This means that the three indices are the average of
their respective dummies.
Higher index values correspond to a more severe legal protection of tenants against rent move-
ments and unwanted evictions. That is, the higher each index the higher the level of regulation
of private tenancies. At this point, the longitudinal rental market regulation index follows the
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Table 1: The Rental Market Regualtion Index
Variable Description
Rent laws
D1: Real rent freeze The dummy equals one if landlords may not increase
rents by more than the growth of ocial cost or price indices.
D2: Nominal rent freeze The dummy equals one if rents are determined solely
by the government or another institution.
D3: Rent level control The dummy equals one if landlords
may not charge rents above a certain rent level.
D4: Intertenancy decontrol The dummy equals one if rent control
holds at the beginning and during the tenancy.
D5: Other specic rent decontrol The dummy equals one if certain kind
of dwellings are not de-controlled such as new
constructions, vacant dwellings or luxurious housing.
D6: Specic rent recontrol The dummy equals one if certain kind
of dwellings fall under a stricter rent regime.
RL: Rent laws index Measures the overall degree of rent control
for new and sitting tenants as the average of D1 to D6.
Tenure security laws
D7: Eviction protection The dummy equals one if only reasonable reasons leads
during term or period to a warranted eviction during the term or rent payment period.
D8: Eviction protection The dummy equals one if only reasonable reasons leads
at the end of term or period to a warranted eviction at the end of term or rent payment period.
D9: Minimum duration The dummy equals one if a minimum duration period of
more than two years is compulsory for every private tenancy.
D10: Short-term tenancies The dummy equals one if short-term tenancies that
are tenancies up to a year are not allowed.
TSL: Tenure security laws index Measures the degree of security of tenure as the average
of D7 to D10.
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mentioned approaches of the leximetric literature (Deakin et al. 2007; Botero et al. 2004; La
Porta et al. 1998; La Porta et al. 2008). This approach implies that laws regulating private
tenancies limit the formal freedom of landlords and the whole market. However, the abundance
of such rules enhances the freedom of contract.
Yet the regulation of tenancies does not solely redirect resources from landlords to renters;
tenancy law rules may also serve an eciency aspect as Deakin (2007) argues in the case of
labour market regulation. For private tenancies, rules of tenure security and rents may provide
insurance against the risks of eviction of the tenant or rising rents. Rules can also compensate
for informational asymmetries (Stiglitz 2000) and further ineciencies that arises due to other
uncertainties. Therefore, both a maximum and a minimum score may not be automatically optimal
for renters in the end, given the possible ineciencies (Basu, Emerson 2000, 2003; Arnott 1995)
and the mentioned asymmetries it provokes.
In contrast to most of the datasets of legal origin approaches the dataset constructed here is
of longitudinal nature (Deakin et al. 2007). That means the panel is not only cross-sectional
but also time-variant. This allows a much deeper analysis of the development and distribution of
private tenancies regulation (Deakin et al. 2007). Furthermore, the structure allows us to use each
dummy separately for further empirical or theoretical work. This holds true especially for more
qualitative analysis such as the analysis of special combinations or single regulation outcomes.
The here constructed indices measure formal legal rules. According to Botero et al. (2004) the
following two concerns can be made: First, the enforcement of rules may vary over the sample.
However, the quality of enforcement cannot be measured directly. But we can get a rough estimate
of the enforcement quality. In the case of private tenancy markets the court formalism index for
eviction of tenants in the event of outstanding rent payments may be such an control variable
(Djankov et al. 2003). In any case, despite the critique that formal legal rules do not fully matter,
an extensive literature shows that formal rules do matter a lot (La Porta et al. 1998; Djankov
et al. 2003; Botero et al. 2004; Djankov et al. 2007; Djankov et al. 2008). Second, the focus
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on formal rules is misleading because formally distinct legal systems can and do achieve the same
functional outcome as common law systems, only by dierent means. However, this criticism is
not convincing, because rental market law is statutory in every country. Even in common law
countries deviations are exceptions and not the rule (Botero et al. 2004).
The indices consider standard contracts and their exemptions. If there are two equitable rent
control methods, the more liberal one has been observed. The idea is that lawful tenancy contracts
would usually shift to the more liberal version since tenants are generally in a weaker position
before the rental contract is signed. Nevertheless, regulatory exceptions such as new construction
deregulations or spatial reregulations are taken into account by the index.
This work examines private rental market regulation from 1973 to 2014 on a yearly basis. In
order to codify the necessary information, a range of sources was used. First, major reforms were
identied by using secondary literature on rental market regulation such as the large accumulation
of country reports of the two broad research projects in law by the Florence University and the
University of Bremen that were nished in 2005 and 2013, respectively. Second, the identied
major reforms were analysed in detail in the mentioned areas covered by rent law and tenure
security law. Mainly primary sources such as legal texts were acquired via national law databases
or direct requests to the ministry or dierent tenant and landlord associations. Finally, the
qualitatively surveyed tenancy law data was cross-checked with large country surveys like e.g.
Whitehead et al. (2012) and Scanlon et al. (2011) or single country reports such as Miron (1995)
for Canada Ontario, Satsangi (1998) for France or Johannsson (1998) for Finland and Sweden to
mention just a few. Interviews or surveys were not used as sources like it was done by the OECD
(Andrews et al. 2011) or the Wharton Residential Land Use Regulation Index (Gyourko et al.
2008).
We outline in detail on the rent laws - and tenure security laws indices below.
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2.2.1 Rent Laws
Rent laws are the framework for the determination of rents. Both the xing of rents at the
beginning of a tenancy and its development during the term are directly aected by rent law.
However, rent law may also allow exemptions from rent control, e.g. for special contract and
dwelling types. Considering the complex structure of rent control laws six dummies capture the
most important aspects of rent regulation within a country. The composition of the dummies
follows the standard classications given by Arnott (1995, 2003) and Lind (2001). Hence the
rent law index considers rst- and second-generation rent control. The six dummies are: (i) real
rent freeze, (ii) nominal rent freeze, (iii) rent level control, (iv) intertenancy decontrol, (v) other
specic decontrols, and (vi) specic rent recontrol. The rst three dummies measure direct rent
controls for standard tenancies. The latter three dummies check for exemptions.
Dummy D1 checks whether landlords can raise rents by more than index linked prices or costs
per year. Price indices are meant to represent any ocial consumer or any other ocial price index.
Cost indices stand for ocial construction cost indices or ocial mortgage cost benchmarks or
indexed housing costs. Dummy D1 turns one if rents cannot grow by more than a cost or price
index per year. Dummy D2 deals with a nominal rent freeze. This dummy checks whether rents
may not be updated at all or just at a rate that is dened by governments or institutions erratically.
Nowadays, this kind of very strict rent regulation is rarely observed in advanced economies. It was
not unusual between 1950s and the 1970s in several countries, however. The dummy turns one if
rents may not be updated by more than the ocial xed rate. This does not exclude the unusual
case of the ocial xed rate may turn out to be higher than the consumer or cost price index for
a special year. Dummy D3 deals with qualitative rent ceilings. There exist several dierent types
of upper rent limits. These ceilings may look like a quality based comparative rent as they are
currently used in the Netherlands, a reference rent level as dened in Germany or Sweden, and a
so-called fair rent level as was the case in New South Wales or England.
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The rst three mentioned dummies equal one in case of a very strict rent control regime. Yet
there can be rent regulations that have a real rent freeze but not a certain qualitative rent level
that may not be exceeded and vice versa. In the former Spanish tenancy law, in comparison, rents
were not allowed to be increased by more than the ocial consumer price index but an upper
ceiling for rents did not ocially exist.
The remaining three dummies check for exemptions of the current rent regulation system. In
reality, many countries have passed laws that limit existing rent controls. The index checks for the
four most common ways of deregulation. Therefore, the fourth dummy D4 checks whether rents
are not regulated between dierent tenancies. It is meant to nd out about so-called deregulation-
reregulation types where the deregulation just refers to the initial rents of new contracts. After
the initial rent was set freely or at the common market level the tenancy is recontrolled again. In
some Californian cities this kind of deregulation has been used for new constructed dwellings, for
example. Arnott (2003) and Lind (2001) also distinguishes between regulation types where rents
are controlled for all tenants or just for staying tenants. The dummy turns one if initial rents of
tenancies are regulated.
The fth dummy D5 checks for decontrol of special dwelling types or in certain areas. The
most common method here is the deregulation of newly built dwellings. It has been an often used
method to enhance investments in rental housing. This kind of deregulation has recently been
in use in Denmark and other countries. Other forms of full decontrol are vacancy decontrol or
rent level decontrol. Vacancy decontrol can be manifold. Here, vacancy decontrol includes both
dwellings that have to be vacant for a longer period and for all rentals in a certain area if the local
vacancy rate has risen above a certain level (Lind 2001). Another form may be a full liberalisation
of high-end dwellings. That is, rentals become decontrolled if the rents reach a predetermined
rent level or the apartments reach a certain amount of quality level. Currently such a system is
in use in the Netherlands where rentals with a certain high rent level are free from rent control.
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The dummy turns one if there is no form of decontrol whatsoever.9
However, tenancy law may oer the possibility for special dwellings or areas to be controlled
stricter. This case is examined by the Dummy D6. The most recent example for such stricter
rent control is Germany where rent increases may be restricted in special regions in case there
is a serious shortage of free rentals. In Switzerland such spatially enhanced rent control existed
also in the 1970s and 1980s. Usually, this kind of exemptions from standard rent controls is not
widespread.
2.2.2 Tenure security laws
The tenure security laws address the tenants' protection against eviction and the landlords' rights
to repossess their property respectively. Furthermore, legal rules about the duration of tenancies
may also play a signicant role for landlords and tenants (Arnott 1995). Therefore, the tenure
security laws index is the average of four dummies which are: (vii) eviction protection during term
or period, (viii) eviction protection at the end of the term or period, (ix) compulsory minimum
duration, and (x) the treatment of short-term tenancies.
The dummies D7 and D8 check whether landlords need reasonable reasons in order to evict a
tenant or whether they are not bound to any restriction if wanting to evict the tenant. Reasonable
reasons are breaches of contract like non-payment of rents, harassment and endangerment of
neighbours or damages to the rented dwelling by the tenant. Furthermore, landlords could have
reasonable reasons for repossession that are predened by law, such as own personal needs, sale
or restoration and reconstructions.10 These reasonable reasons have to be dened by law. The
dummies D7 and D8 dier in their time-reference. While D7 checks for eviction protection during
the term or period of the tenancy, the other dummy do so for tenancies at the end of the term or
9 Please note that dummy D5 automatically turns one if a free rent regime is in power and dummy D6 au-
tomatically turns one in case of full rent regulation.
10 Own personal needs mean that not only the landlord but also spouses and near relatives may live in the rental.
Restoration is dened as the necessity of a complete restoration. These kinds of mechanisms may be chosen by
landlords who plan to enhance the quality of the building in order to attain higher future rent payments. Finally,
selling a vacant dwelling as opposed to a rented one might be attractive for landlords at the expense of tenants
since unleased dwellings generally obtain much higher prices.
12
period of payments. Usually, the latter comes up if time limited contracts or minimum duration
periods for tenancies end.
This dierentiation is necessary since eviction protection often distinguish between these two
stages. There are several countries where landlords may call for eviction at the end of the agreed
term without the need of giving any reasons while during the term tenants enjoy full protection.
In England, Assured Shorthold tenancies may be nished by the landlord without any reason at
the end of the term or at the end of a payment period of a periodical tenancy. Since landlords
may favour short contracts due to exibility reasons in the case of information asymmetries (Basu,
Emerson 2000, 2003), tenants face high uncertainty as far as the duration of their private tenancies
is concerned. As a consequence, in countries where xed term tenancies end automatically the
duration of private tenancies can shrink substantially to very short periods. This eect has
appeared, for example, in the USA where 97.7 percent of all tenancies last one year or less
(Genesove 2003). In Great Britain, the median length of tenancies is around two years according to
the Oce for National Statistics (2011). In Germany, however, tenants enjoy eviction protection
both during and at the end of the short-term or payment period. Limited tenancies do not end
automatically and evictions are bound to special reasons like personal needs or future restoration
plans. As a consequence, tenancies in Germany last longer. Therefore, a typical tenancy lasts
around six years (Fuchs, Fitzenberger 2013).
The dummies D9 and D10 primarily deal with duration rules. The ninth dummy of the
tenure security laws index checks for a compulsory minimum duration term of more than two
years. In some European countries those kinds of tenancy length regulations are in practice.
For example, in Spain, France or Italy private tenancies have to last for a minimum duration
period of more than two years. During that time tenants usually enjoy higher tenure security
and rents are controlled stricter. As for Spain, during the compulsory minimum duration period
landlords may evict tenants only for heavy contract breaches. After the initial ve or eight years
landlords in Spain may evict tenants also due to personal needs. Mora Sanguinetti (2010) discusses
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minimum duration periods and shows, using Basu and Emerson's approach (2000), that these form
of regulation can lead to a shrinkage of rental markets and higher rents.
The dummy D10 addresses short-term tenancies. Short-term tenancies are dened as tenancies
that are limited in time. The time limitation may go down to less than a year. Tenancies that
are limited in time but have a minimum duration are not treated as short-term tenancies. The
dummy checks whether short-term tenancies are forbidden by law. In England, New Zealand or
US-states like Massachusetts short-term contracts are the most common form of renting. However,
in Austria short-term contracts are not allowed. Here, only time limited tenancies are allowed
that have to last at least three years with a considerably lower rent level. The dummy turns 1 if
classical short-term tenancies are forbidden by law.
2.3 Data and Index Properties
Indexing the information about rent laws and tenure security laws for each country or state and
each year gives us a unique time-variant index of private rental market regulation for 18 advanced
economies for a time period of 42 years starting in 1973. Sometimes rental market laws are made
on a regional level, for example in the USA, Australia or Canada. When this is the case, special
states are used as a proxy for the whole country. Over the examined time period, the regulation
of rentals has changed signicantly in the majority of countries. The following Figures 1-3 and
Tables 2-3 show the development of rent laws, tenure security laws and rental market regulation
as the composition of all dummies. For the mentioned period, roughly 37 relevant reforms of
rental market regulation have been identied in the sample. The index signals 28 reforms of
deregulations and 9 reforms that enhancing regulation. According to the dataset, the majority of
reforms took place in the last century peaking in the 1980s and 1990s.11
11 AUS NSW=Australia=New South Wales, CAN ONT= Ontario, USA MA=Massachusetts,
USA CA=California
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2.3.1 Data
The data shows remarkable changes of rental market regulation across countries and over time.
Three dierent phases of regulation can be identied. The rst phase is located in the 1970s. It
is a time of reregulation in the form of rst- and second-generation rent control re-gimes. For
the 1970s the rental market regulation index outlines an increase in regulation. During that time
period, a broad reregulation - not only in private rental markets but also in labour and other
markets - took place in western countries. Just two decades before the 1970s, rst-generation
rent control regimes that had been installed during wartime were abandoned or phased out in
many countries (Hubert 2003). As a consequence, the picture is very diverse across countries: In
several European countries, rst-generation rent control regimes stayed more or less unchanged
until the 1980s. This holds true for example for Spain, England or Finland. On the other hand,
countries like France installed more powerful rst-generation rent control regimes in the 1970s.
The development of rent control regimes is somewhat dierent in Northern America in the 1970s.
There, merely second-generation rent control regimes emerged in parts of several states that
had been completely deregulated before, such as in Massachusetts or California. In Ontario the
development was similar to those in the USA (Arnott 1995).
The second phase is characterized by a broad trend of deregulation. In the last two decades of
the twentieth century many countries experienced a phase of severe deregulation. In some countries
the deregulation provoked several reactions of reregulation like in France in 1989 or Spain in 1994.
During that period, the vast majority of western European countries changed its rent control
regime to a less strict one, such as second-generation or even free rent regimes. Large changes
occurred e.g. in England and Finland. In these countries, rent control regimes were adopted
with very lax or even no rent control combined with very weak tenure security. In California
or Massachusetts, the trend of rent regulation phased out in the 1990s. In Massachusetts, rent
control was fully abandoned in 1995. In California, however, several cities still use some form
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of rent and eviction control. However, the controlled sections of the Californian rental housing
markets signicantly diminished in the past thirty years. In Canada, the regulation of private
tenancies was also steadily liberalised since the 1990s.
The third phase is characterized by a tremendous housing market turmoil. The phase started
with the beginning of the new millennium. In the rst years of the new decade the price for houses
rose tremendously in many countries of the panel. Ownership markets experienced a strong boom.
At the end of the rst decade the upswing of the house prices was followed by a hurtful downturn of
house prices and housing market activity in many advanced countries of the panel. The harmful
boom and bust cycles in several advanced economies gave impetus to the interest in housing
market regulation such as rent and eviction control. An unambiguous and uniform direction of
rental market regulation, however, did not occur in these years. On the one hand, Ireland and
Germany installed stricter regulations of private tenancies in the footsteps of a housing market
boom.12 It is noticeable that the Irish tightening of rental market policy in 2004 was signicantly
larger than the one in Germany in 2015. On the other hand, the nancial market crisis and the
European debt crisis in the wake of the burst of the great housing market meltdown facilitated
sharp rental market deregulations in countries that were received international funding due to
their dicult economic situation. Under these circumstances the two Eurozone member states
Spain and Portugal13 underwent a tremendous deregulation that replaced second-generation rent
control by fully liberalized rent determination.
2.3.2 Convergence over time
In the past 42 years the regulation of private rentals followed the broad trends sketched above.
From the year 1980 onwards, both rent and tenure security laws experienced a process of net
liberalisation. However, the process of rent control liberalisation was much deeper and more
12 The stricter rules for Germany are not illustrated by the gures since the indices end in 2014. However, the
stricter rent control law in Germany would have turned D6 from zero to one.
13 Portugal, however, is not part of the our time-variant country panel.
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Figure 1: Rental Market Regulation Index
evenly distributed than for tenure security. As table 2.2 shows, the mean of the rent control laws
index has fallen from 0.57 in 1980 to 0.28 in 2014. In the same time, the tenure security laws
index has declined from 0.64 to 0.50. Furthermore, the cross-country standard deviations of the
rent laws index became signicantly lower than the cross-country standard deviations of tenure
security laws index. While the standard deviation of rent control has fallen from 0.28 in 1973 to
0.18 in 2014, the deviation of tenure security laws has risen from 0.21 in 1973 to 0.31 in 2014. In
other words, the regulation of rents converged over the whole country panel while tenure security
laws have diverged.
According to the legal origin theory (La Porta et al. 2008) the legal tradition is time-invariant
predictor of the level of regulation in a country. The authors of legal origin theory showed in
numerous studies that regulation in common law countries is generally lower than in countries
with a French, Scandinavian or German legal origin (La Porta et al. 1998; Djankov et al. 2002b,
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Figure 2: Rent Laws Index
2003; Botero et al. 2004; Djankov et al. 2007). The theory implies that legal origin is the strongest
predictor of the diversity of regulation intensities and governmental market interventions. Djankov
et al. (Djankov et al. 2007) show that there is no signicant convergence of creditor rights or
creditor information systems among legal origin over time. In contrast, the convergence theory
predicts that regulation converge among countries towards the more successful one. Thus, it
contradicts the legal origin theory (Djankov et al. 2007). However, Lele and Siems (2006) show
that shareholder protection has converged over time irrespective its legal origin. As far as rent
control laws are considered, Whitehead et al. (2012) show a process of broad convergence towards
more liberalised markets for a small panel of European countries by comparing rental market
regulation in 1980 and 2010.
The time-variant country sample14 support both the legal origin and the convergence theory.15
14 There are 7 common law countries, 4 French legal origin countries, 3 German legal origin and 4 Scandinavian
legal origin countries in the sample.
15 Please note that this is a purely descriptive analysis. For a more robust conclusion a more analytical analysis
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Figure 3: Tenure Security Laws Index
Looking at the development of private rental market regulation for the various legal origins shows
clear dierences. With respect to the regulation of rents there is a convergence among the dierent
legal origins, especially for common, French and Scandinavian legal origin countries that converged
considerably towards lower levels. Tables 2 and 3 show that rent control has been relaxed on
average in common law, French law and Scandinavian law countries but not in German law
countries where rent laws index remained more or less unchanged on an already lower average of
0.33 or below. This means that rent control laws are on average more homogenously distributed
over the groups of dierent legal origins. As far as tenure security laws are concerned, the data
shows a downward trend in the average level of regulation only for Scandinavian legal origin and
common law countries. The level of tenure security in French legal origin countries, in contrast,
follows an upward trend. German legal origin countries, in turn, show on average a very robust
would be needed.
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score of tenure security over time of 0.50. Hence, both legal origins did not converge toward lower
levels. This can be interpreted as evidence for the legal origin theory that predicts that countries
stick to certain regulatory styles according to their legal origin. However, the convergence of rent
control laws between all legal origins and tenure security laws between Scandinavian and common
law countries support the theory of a transnational harmonisation of regulation.
The broader legal convergence of rent control laws was part of broad liberalization trends that
started in common law countries and were then adapted by Scandinavian and French legal origin
countries. Reasons for these convergences could be a more and more globally harmonized view
on the `right policy' on housing markets or a higher impact of certain school of thoughts. As
mentioned before, there is a broad consensus among economists that rent control generally harms
housing markets. However, the picture is dierent for tenure security laws. Here the convergence
can be detected only between Scandinavian and common law countries. The lesser connection
in patterns of regulation in this eld may be due to the fact that tenure security is less popular
discussed in academia and politics since it is was not seen as a classical intervention in the market
price mechanism. The convergence of Scandinavian legal origin countries towards common law
countries, however, may be due to a closer connection between Scandinavia and Anglo-Saxon
world in the past decades.
20
Table 2: The Rental Market Regualtion Index Over Time
Rent laws index Tenure security laws index Rent laws index Tenure security laws index
mean standard deviation
1973 0.49 0.63 0.28 0.21
1974 0.49 0.63 0.28 0.21
1975 0.52 0.60 0.25 0.23
1976 0.56 0.64 0.24 0.23
1977 0.56 0.64 0.24 0.23
1978 0.55 0.64 0.23 0.23
1979 0.57 0.65 0.22 0.21
1980 0.57 0.64 0.22 0.21
1981 0.56 0.64 0.23 0.21
1982 0.49 0.60 0.27 0.26
1983 0.49 0.60 0.27 0.26
1984 0.49 0.60 0.27 0.26
1985 0.46 0.56 0.26 0.25
1986 0.44 0.51 0.26 0.23
1987 0.44 0.49 0.24 0.23
1988 0.43 0.47 0.24 0.24
1989 0.43 0.49 0.24 0.26
1990 0.43 0.47 0.24 0.27
1991 0.42 0.47 0.24 0.27
1992 0.39 0.47 0.22 0.27
1993 0.37 0.49 0.21 0.28
1994 0.36 0.53 0.20 0.30
1995 0.33 0.49 0.23 0.31
1996 0.31 0.46 0.22 0.31
1997 0.31 0.46 0.22 0.31
1998 0.28 0.47 0.21 0.33
1999 0.30 0.46 0.22 0.32
2000 0.30 0.46 0.22 0.32
2001 0.30 0.46 0.22 0.32
2002 0.30 0.46 0.22 0.32
2003 0.30 0.46 0.22 0.32
2004 0.32 0.50 0.21 0.31
2005 0.32 0.50 0.21 0.31
2006 0.32 0.50 0.21 0.31
2007 0.32 0.50 0.21 0.31
2008 0.32 0.50 0.21 0.31
2009 0.32 0.50 0.21 0.31
2010 0.31 0.50 0.21 0.31
2011 0.30 0.50 0.17 0.31
2012 0.30 0.50 0.17 0.31
2013 0.28 0.50 0.18 0.31
2014 0.28 0.50 0.18 0.31
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Table 3: The Rental Market Regualtion Index Over Time by Legal Origin'
Rent laws index Tenure security Rent laws index Tenure security
laws index laws index
mean standard deviation
Data by legal origin group means
Common law
1974 0.33 0.57 0.24 0.24
1984 0.40 0.50 0.25 0.29
1994 0.29 0.32 0.21 0.24
2004 0.24 0.36 0.16 0.20
2014 0.24 0.36 0.16 0.20
French legal origin
1974 0.63 0.69 0.32 0.31
1984 0.71 0.81 0.08 0.24
1994 0.42 0.81 0.10 0.24
2004 0.33 0.88 0.14 0.25
2014 0.25 0.88 0.22 0.25
German legal origin
1974 0.33 0.50 0.17 0.00
1984 0.22 0.50 0.10 0.00
1994 0.33 0.50 0.17 0.25
2004 0.33 0.50 0.17 0.25
2014 0.33 0.50 0.17 0.25
Scandinavian legal origin
1974 0.75 0.75 0.17 0.00
1984 0.63 0.63 0.32 0.25
1994 0.46 0.63 0.28 0.25
2004 0.46 0.38 0.34 0.32
2014 0.33 0.38 0.24 0.32
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3 Eects of Private Regulation Index on Rents
Using a new panel with data on private tenancy regulation in 18 advanced economies, this section
quantitatively analyze the eects of our regulation index on housing rents. The analysis will focus
on the eects of rst-generation rent control regimes, second-generation rent control regimes and
free rent regimes on the behaviour of real rents. Since there is a great variety of regulation types
within the group of second-generation rent control regimes the eects may vary from type to
type. Therefore, these regimes will be evaluated in more detail and largely independently of the
experience with rst-generation controls and rent free regimes. The dierentiation will be made
along the dierent levels of tenure security.
Our empirical analysis mostly veries the theory on rent control. Our main empirical results
can be summarized as follows: First, very strict rent control regimes do provoke lower real rent
growth rates than regimes with free rents. Second, tenure security plays a signicant role for
the eects of second-generation rent control regimes on rents. The analysis shows that soft rent
control regimes with time limited tenure security and minimum duration periods may cause higher
rent growth rates than free rent regimes. Lastly, the rent free regimes do not show signicant high
real rent appreciation rates. Instead, the rent data reveals that the mean real rent growth is
statistically not dierent than zero for the free rent regimes.
As we strictly focus on three dierent rent control regimes, rst -, second generation and free
rent regimes, we briey elaborate on the theory behind the rst and second generation rent control
regimes before our empirical analysis below. The standard textbook model of the rst generation
rent control is where the rent is pre-set below the market rent, consequently the rent control
regimes creating an excess demand on the rental market. Unlike the rst generation rent control
regime, the second generation regime covers all soft rent control regimes including tenancy rent
control regimes
We base our empirical analysis on the model framework by Basu and Emerson (2000) and its
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Table 4: Descriptions of Variables and Rent Control Regimes'
Variables and Sources
Variables Source
Nominal Rents Australian Bureau of Statistics (Sydney), Statistics Austria,
Statistics Canada (Toronto),
FRED (Boston, Los Angeles), OECD (all other countries)
Consumer price ination Australian Bureau of Statistics (Sydney), Statistics Canada (Toronto),
FRED (Boston, LosAngeles, Denmark, France, UK), )
Thomson Reuters Datastream (all other countries)
GDP per Capita World Bank (WDI database), in US Dollar (real)
Nominal House Prices Stapledon (2007) & Australian Bureau of Statistics (Sydney),
Statistics Austria (Vienna, Austria), Staistics Canada (Toronto),
FRED (Massachusetts,California)
Population World Bank (WDI database)
rst generation rent control regime Dummy variable that turns 1 if D2 = 1; see section 2 for more information
second generation rent control regime A Dummy variable that turns 1 if D1 and/or D3=1,
D2=0, D7=1, D8=1, D9 and/or D10=1
second generation rent control regime B Dummy variable that turns 1 if D1 and/or D3=1,
D2=0, D7=1, D8=0, D9 and/or D10=1
second generation rent control regime C Dummy variable that turns 1 if D1 and/or D3=1,
D2=0, D7=1, D8=1, D9 and D10=0
second generation rent control regime D Dummy variable that turns 1 if D1 and/or D3=1,
D2=0, D7=1, D8=0, D9 and D10=0
free rent regime Dummy variable that turns 1 if D1=0, D2=0 , D3=0
modications by Mora-Sanguinetti (2010). Basu and Emerson (2000) build a partial equilibrium
model for the private rental housing market where the market is confronted with information
asymmetries between the agents { landlord and tenants - and with adverse selection. Consquently,
the model helps in explaining the eects of contemporary soft regulation regimes including the
eects of tenure security. The basic model deals with a strict intertenancy de-control regime and
high tenure security. The modications made by Mora-Sanguinetti (2010) widen the application
of the model on contemporary rent regimes.
3.1 Data Description with Various Rent Control Regimes
This section describes the variables as well as dierent rent control regimes that we use in the
quantitative analysis. The data gather economic information on 18 advanced economies from 1973
to 2014. Table 4 describes the data used as variables and their sources.
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Table 5: Summary Statistics'
Descriptive Statstics
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Real Rent 725 0.006 0.041 -0.304 0.306
Nominal Rent 725 0.051 0.054 -0.363 0.372
Real GDP per Capita 725 0.017 0.022 -0.087 0.097
Ination 738 0.046 0.045 -0.058 0.270
Real House Prices 716 0.022 0.088 -0.236 0.609
Nominal House Prices 716 0.068 0.096 -0.221 0.852
Population 738 0.006 0.005 -0.017 0.050
Note: The summary statistics show annual growth rate.
The nominal rents mostly come from the OECD. The rents are from the OECD housing market
dataset (Kennedy et al. 2006). Rents from countries that are not covered by the OECD data
come from ocial national statistic agencies. Basically, nominal rents are taken from the OECD
and national agencies for the dierent countries, states or towns. Due to a serious lack of data for
Ontario, New South Wales, California and Massachusetts, rents from the biggest cities of these
states are used as a proxy for the whole state.16
The majority of consumer price data is from the Thomson Reuters database. Countries not
fully covered by the mentioned database are taken from ocial national agencies such as the FRED
database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis or the Australian Bureau of Statistics. The
real GDP per capita data and the population data are taken from the World Bank Dataset. For
all economies, the GDP per Capita is displayed in US-Dollars. For Ontario, New South Wales,
England, Massachusetts and California the country data are taken as proxies due to a lack of
ocial state data for such a long time horizon. Nominal house price data for the mentioned
countries are mostly from the mentioned OECD database and other databases of ocial agencies.
Table 5 shows the summarize statistics on these variables.
The transfer of rental market regulation (see section 2) into mutual exclusive rent control
regimes is explained in the following. The dierent rent control regimes are divided up into
16 House price indices for Austria and New South Wales were too short. The basic series was then continued
with a reasonable house price series of the same country by using its growth rates.
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six mutual exclusive regulation regimes, namely rst-generation rent control regimes, second-
generation rent control regimes and free rent regimes. Second-generation rent regimes in turn
are stratied in four regimes along dierent levels of tenure security. According to Arnott (1995)
tenure security is a crucial determinant of how the regulation of rent may impact rents or the whole
housing market. The dierent regimes are listed from A to D and will be explained in alphabetical
order. The source for the dierentiation are the dierent dummies presented in Table 1.
All second-generation rent control regimes have the same soft rent regulation, which is rent
level regulation or real rent freeze regulation as dened in section 2. Both a nominal rent freeze
regime and a rent free regime are left out here meaning that dummies D1 and/or D3 equal one.
Dummy D2, however, is zero. Intertenancy decontrol that is checked by D4 is not considered
here. First, this is due to the larger samples for every regime guaranteeing higher quality for
the panel estimation. Second, it is assumed that in a world of soft rent control landlords have
a stronger bargaining power at the beginning of a tenancy when several tenants contest for a
tenancy. Tenants, however, enjoy higher power during the term thanks to tenure security. Then,
landlords might be less able to get the maximum lawful rent escalation since tenants may reject
the landlord's interest much easier as they already live in the dwelling. Thus, it is assumed that
there is always some sort of intertenancy decontrol in soft rent regulation regimes.
The second-generation rent control regime A displays a regime with soft rent regulation and
a very high tenure security with eviction protection during and at the end of a term and a
mandatory minimum duration and/ or a prohibition of short term tenancies. Regime B checks
for a rent regime where tenants are safe from unreasonable eviction during the tenancy but not at
the end of a term or period. Furthermore, type-B regimes oer a mandatory minimum duration
and/or prohibited short term tenancies as dened in section 2. In turn, regime C mirrors another
type of tenure security in which tenants are protected from unreasonable eviction during and at
the end of a tenancy term or period. Minimum duration terms are not mandatory by law and
short term tenancies are not forbidden. Regime D diers from the type-C regime in the way that
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tenants are only protected during a period or term but not at the end. There are no mandatory
minimum durations and short term tenancies are allowed.
First-generation rent control regimes and free rent regimes are not dierentiated by tenure
security. The underlying assumption is that tenure security does not crucially matter for the
evolution of rents for both, rst-generation rent control regimes and free rent regimes. As for free
rent regimes, it does not matter whether tenure security is high or low since landlords may freely
adjust rents at any point of the contract since there are by law no restrictions (Basu and Emerson,
2000). On the other hand, rst-generation rent control regimes follow a similar logic. As rents
cannot be adjusted between or during the term of a tenancy, the eects of tenure security may
be negligible. Furthermore, there is nearly a full coincidence of nominal rent freeze17 regimes and
high tenure security in the form of high protection against eviction and minimum duration terms
and forbidden short term tenancies.
3.2 Empirical Results
Before presenting the results, some aspects should be noted here. We refer to the free rent regime
as our benchmark regime when analyzing the eects of the rent regulation on dierent regimes. As
our objective is to present the interaction between regulation and rent dynamics in the simplest
and most transparent empirical method without the lose of generality and focus. Nevertheless,
we include various robustness tests such as adding country and time xed eects for our analysis
to strengthen our results. Even with various robustness estimations, we note that many adequate
control variables such as vacancy rates are not available for the vast majority of economies for the
whole observation period.
Table 6 presents the mean growth rates of real rents for the dierent rent regimes.18 The
following three observations are noticeable: First, real rent dynamics are on average negative for
17 Nominal rent freeze can be misleading here since the data shows that nominal rents were indeed adjusted.
However, mostly the rent adjustments under these regimes turned out to be much lower than consumer price
ination.
18 See Figure 5 in the Appendix for the detail rent regimes for the economies in question.
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Table 6: Real Rent Growth by Regimes
Variables Real Rent Observations Std. Dev.
First generation rent control regime -0.012 105 0.048
Second generation rent control regime A 0.004 95 0.030
Second generation rent control regime B 0.022 50 0.077
Second generation rent control regime C 0.010 124 0.025
Second generation rent control regime D 0.009 158 0.023
Free rent regime 0.006 193 0.045
Note: This table presents the means of real rent growth for each rent regime. The analysis covers the sample of 18 advcanced economies over
the period 1973 - 2014. Data descriptions can be found in the Tables 1 and 5.
countries with the strictest rent control regime. Second, free rent regimes on average show real
rents growth rate of 0.6 percent per year. Third, second-generation rent control regimes of the
types B, C, and D show on average higher real rent growth rates. In this group, second-generation
rent regimes with eviction protection during but not at the end of mandatory minimum duration
term (type-B) show the highest real rent growth rates of more than 2 percent on average.
We also provide in Figure 4 the average real rent growth rates for all countries three years
before and three years after the implementation of a new regime. The results conrm the results
of Table 6 and the theoretical implications by Basu and Emerson (2000). While real rents on
average fall in the rst two years after the implementation of rst-generation rent control regimes
real rent growth rates undergo a visible upturn after the implementation of the second-generation
rent control regime B. The introduction of a free rent regime in turn does not show any strong
rent escalations on average. For the remaining second-generation rent control regimes a clear
movement cannot be drawn.
Table 7 that shows the correlations between the dierent rent regimes and real rent growth
further provides signicant empirical evidence of the relationship between the growth of real rents
and the rental market regulation regime. Table 7 shows three signicant correlations at the ten
percent level: (i) a positive correlation between second-generation rent control regime B and real
rents, (ii) a negative correlation between rst-generation rent control regimes and real rents, and
(iii) a positive correlation between rea GDP per capita growth and real rents. These results so far
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Figure 4: Real Rent Growth Before And After Rent Reform For All Countries
conrm the theory and previous statistical evaluation.
Table 8 shows the panel estimation results.19 The panel estimation addresses statistical prob-
lems that could emerge through heteroscedasticity and serial correlation by the use of robust
standard errors and clustered errors. Both country and time xed eects and robust standard and
clustered error terms are used. Using country and years xed eects, the estimation takes advan-
tage of within-country variation in institutional variables (Djankov et al. 2007). Furthermore, the
results of the Hausman test (Hausman 1978) support the decision to use of country xed eects.20
The dependent variable is the year on year growth rate of real rents for each country and year.
Exogenous variables are several dummy variables as identiers of dierent rent regimes, namely
rst-generation rent control regimes and the second-generation rent control regimes A, B, C and
19 Various robustness estimations are presented in the Appedix.
20 The Hausman test can be found in the appendix of this chapter in Figure 8. Note, however, the simultaneous
use of year xed eects and clustered error terms brings the number of exogenous variables in a disproportion to
the degrees of freedom of the model.
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Table 7: Correlation Between Real rent and Its Determinants
Real Rent
First generation rent control regime -0.17***
Second generation rent control regime A -0.01
Second generation rent control regime B 0.11***
Second generation rent control regime C 0.05
Second generation rent control regime D 0.05
Free rent regime 0.00
Real GDP/capita 0.07*
Population -0.02
Real House Prices 0.01
***= significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level
Table 8: Panel Regressions
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Robust SE Cluster SE Cluster SE Robust SE Cluster SE Cluster SE
1st rent -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.031** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.030**
control regime (0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011)
2nd rent
control regimes
Type A -0.004 -0.004 -0.007
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Type B 0.026* 0.026** 0.027** 0.026* 0.026** 0.027***
(0.013) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009)
Type C 0.004 0.004 0.007
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Type D -0.003 -0.003 -0.001
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Type ACD -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Real GDP/capita 0.163 0.163 0.176 0.165 0.165 0.181
(0.141) (0.131) (0.144) (0.140) (0.129) (0.143)
Constant -0.050*** -0.050*** 0.005 -0.051*** -0.051*** 0.006
(0.011) (0.010) (0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.005)
Year Eects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Country Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 712 712 712 712 712 712
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.13 0.08 0.13 0.13 0.08
This is a panel regression of 18 avanced economies over the period 1973 - 2014. The rent control regimes are discrete variables euqal to one
if the respective criterions are fullfilled. Robust standard errors and clustered standard errors are in parantheses. The dependent variable is
the real rent growth rate. ***= significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level
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D. The other rent regimes except free rent regimes are pooled by a dummy as a control variable
since the evaluation and theory did not give a hint for any correlations between real rents and the
implementation of such a regime. Furthermore, the growth of GDP per capita is used as a control
variable. The panel results show a statistically signicant positive eect of second-generation rent
control regimes B of 2.6 and 2.7 percentage points on real rent growth rates compared with free
rent regimes. Furthermore, rst-generation rent control regimes have a signicant negative eect
of -2.7 to -3.0 percentage points on real rent growth compared with free rent regimes. The growth
of real GDP per capita on real rents, however, is not signicant for robust and clustered standard
errors. According to the estimation results, the adjusted R is on a low to medium level.
According to the panel estimation results, the results mostly back the theory. However, not all
second-generation rent control regimes with a distinct level of tenure security match the theory.
The estimation results show that there is no signicant and robust relationship between the rent
control regimes A, C and D and real rents. According to Basu and Emerson (2000), even for
the regime A and C there should have been signicantly higher growth rates than in free rent
regimes. An intuitive explanation for this is that landlords may not be able to recalibrate the
rents enough if tenancies are designed by law for an unlimited time because tenancies are too long
to assess proper higher rents at the beginning. It is very likely that landlords have a much weaker
bargaining position in these regimes since they are generally forced to negotiate rent adjustments
during the term of a tenancy. In countries where the regulation regime oers tenancies unlimited
in time (if D8 = 1) tenants stay up to ten or more years in the dwelling. In that context landlords
have little space for a strong rent bargaining position. However, in regimes with time limited
tenancies with a minimum duration of two or more years and no eviction protection at the end
of the term, landlords regularly enjoy the more powerful bargaining position. These regimes may
come closest to the reality which is theoretically described by Basu and Emerson (2000) and Mora
Sanguinetti (2010).
To check for the robustness of the estimation results other control variables such as the growth
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rate of population and the real growth rate of house prices are added. The robustness checks show
that these additional variables do not inuence the signicance of rst-generation and type-B
second-generation rent control regimes. The results are presented in Figure 6 in the appendix.
Furthermore, four dierent country samples are generated for further robustness checks. In each
sample several countries with a certain legal origin are excluded. In eleven out of twelve estimations
the results of Table 8 are conrmed. The estimation results can be found in Figures 7 to 9 of the
appendix. Finally, the estimation results are even robust against a variation of the estimation's
time horizon such as a six years cut-o at the beginning or end of the time period (Figure 9).
However, shortening the time horizon dampens the explanatory power of the estimations since
most rent freeze systems are located in the 1970s. In other words, the results in Table 8 are robust
against dierent variations of the underlying data sample. In total, 28 out of 29 robustness checks
fully conrm the results in Table 8.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we construct an unique index that measures the regulation of private tenancy
markets. Our index is the rst time-variant index explaining the regulation of private tenancy
markets. The index covers 18 advanced economies from 1973 to 2014 and consists of ten dummies
that quantify characteristics of rent control and tenure security in each country. The index is
able to mirror established classications of private tenancy market regulation such as rst and
second-generation rent control regimes or tenancy rent control regimes. The sources of the index
are both rent and tenure security laws and scientic country reports. Moreover, our time-variant
index shows that the regulation of rental markets supports both the convergence theory and the
legal origin theory. On the one hand, there are signs for the convergence of rent control of French
and Scandinavian law countries towards common law countries. On the other hand, as far as
tenure security laws are mentioned, French and German legal origin countries show on average no
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signs of convergence with common law countries while Scandinavian law countries do. Thus, the
dierences in tenure security laws remained more or less stable among the mentioned legal origins.
Using our newly constructed rental regulation index, our empirical analysis conrms the theory.
Our empirical results fall mainly into three areas. First, very strict rent control regimes do
provoke lower real rent growth rates than regimes with free rents. This result coincides with the
basic and very well-known textbook model. Second, tenure security plays a signicant role for
softer regulation types that belong to the group of second-generation rent control regimes: soft
rent control regimes with time limited tenure security mandatory minimum duration periods may
cause higher rent dynamics than rental markets under free rents. This is in line with the theoretical
approach given by Basu and Emerson (2000) and Mora-Sanguinetti (2010). Their theories state
that under adverse selection and information asymmetries, soft rent control regimes lead to higher
rents if tenure security is high and landlords have greater power to adjust the rent at the start
of the tenancy rather than during the term of a tenancy. In contrast to Basu and Emerson's
model, however, a statistically signicant rent appreciating eect cannot be shown for soft rent
regimes that encourage tenancies unlimited in time through profound eviction protection rules.
An explanation may be that landlords are in a weaker position for too long to reach the critical
value towards eective bargaining power. This situation is ensured by rent regimes where tenants
may stay in a rented dwelling very long due to time-unlimited tenure security.
Third, the rent free regime that is also the benchmark regime on average does not show high
real rent appreciation rates. Instead, the data reveals that the mean real rent growth is slightly
over zero for free rent regimes. Furthermore, high rent appreciation rates are not conducted shortly
after the implementation of free rent regimes. This is antithetic to the often politically exploited
view that a lack of regulation tremendously heats up rents.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Country Reports
Australia
In Australia the dierent states are responsible for the regulation of the private residential
rental market. Thus, private tenancy law varies within the dierent states. Yet, to clarify the
overview, New South Wales (NSW) as the biggest and most important Australian state is analysed
and used in place of the whole country in the following. In NSW the regulation of tenancies has
its origin in 1847; the rst act was passed in 1899. The period of rent control began with the Fair
Rents Act in 1915 (Simpson 1999; Schneller 2013). The most important act after the Second World
War was the Landlord and Tenant Act from 1948 (New South Wales Government 8/16/1948).
According to the act, rents were strictly regulated by fair rents boards and did not match market
rents.
Furthermore, tenancies could not be terminated by landlords without certain grounds (New
South Wales Government 8/16/1948, x 62). The act was amended several times, the regulation of
rents, however, remained unrestrained until the 1950s. In the mid-1950s, newly built and vacant
dwellings were decontrolled (Schneller 2013, xx 44{50). In 1960 around two-third of all rented
dwelling stock was regulated by the Landlord and Tenant Act (Simpson 1999). In 1968 several
important amendments were made. As a consequence, fair rents stopped being calculated after
the strict principles of 1939. Through new ways of rent calculations tenants and landlords were
able to increase rents to the maximum level of a so far fair rent as long the tenant was able to pay
it (Schneller 2013). Protected tenancies decreased tremendously in the upcoming years.
In 1987 the new Landlord and Tenant Act became the central law for tenancies in NSW. The
act lowered the security of tenure. Tenants just enjoyed eviction protection during the term of
time xed tenancies. However, at the end of the xed term and the payment period of periodic
tenancies, landlords did not need to give special reasons in order to repossess the rented dwelling
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(Simpson 1999). Rents and their development were free to be agreed upon. However, tenants
could claim that rents were excessive if the rent exceeded the comparable rent level calculated by
the rent tribunal. Generally, the comparable rent equals market rents for comparable premises
(New South Wales Government 5/12/1987, xx 44{50). After some minor changes the Residential
Tenancy Act 1987 was repealed by the Residential Tenancy Act 2010. However, the new act
did not tremendously change the regulation of rent and tenure security of the RTA from 1986
(Schneller 2013).
Austria
The Austrian tenancy market was intensively intervened by government before and during the
Second World War (Lurger 2005). In the 1960s and 1970s rental market regulation was slightly
modied. The most important law adjustments during that period were the Amending Law of
Tenancy 1967 (Bundeskanzleramt 8/4/1967) and the Amendment to Rent Law 1974 (Bundeskan-
zleramt 7/25/1974). The Amending Law of Tenancy had the aim to liberalise rent and eviction
control in 1967. The Amendment to Rent Law, on the other hand, intensied the control of rents
and eviction procedures (Amann 1999). On balance, Austrian tenancy law favoured tenants' in-
terests in the 1970s. Rents did not match market rents and tenants enjoyed a high level of tenure
security. Rents for rental dwellings built after 1967, however, were free.
In 1981 the Austrian parliament passed the Tenancy Law Act (Bundeskanzleramt 12/1/1981)
giving the Austrian rental market regulation its current character. The new act incorporated not
only principles of the previous law but also new ways of calculating rents of private tenancies.
Nevertheless, there exist several types of regulation for rented dwelling in Austria since both
the rules of the Tenancy Law Act 1981 and the Austrian civil code are the basis of the current
private tenancy regulation. This makes the Austrian tenancy law very complicated today. Since
the implementation of the Tenancy Law Act there have existed three dierent types of private
tenancies. Each is regulated dierently { either solely by the Tenancy Law Act from 1981 (type-3-
tenancies) or the civil code (type-1-tenancies) or as a mix of both legal sources (type-2-tenancies).
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As far as the regulation of rents is concerned, rents of type-1- and type-2-tenancies are not
regulated. Here, the rules of the civil code hold. Therefore, the only rule that limits rents and
rent increases is the violation of moral principles through deception culminating in dubious high
rents. The following dwelling types are type-1- and type-2-tenancies: dwellings built after of 1953
, one- or double-family-houses and roof top properties that got a building permission after 2001
(Bohm 2002; Bundeskanzleramt 12/28/2001). According to the current numbers of the Austrian
tenancy market, the majority of private tenancies fall under a rent free regime (Oberhuber, Denk
2014). Type-3-tenancies, however, provide regulated rents. Rented dwellings of this type are the
second biggest group in the private tenancy market. Category rents and benchmark rents are the
dominant types of rent regulation here. Considering these two methods of rent control, rents have
to follow the principles of comparable rents. Under these rules rents constantly fails market-based
rents.
Aspects of duration and eviction procedures of the majority of all rentals are highly regulated
in Austria. Both, type-2- and type3-tenancies fall under the strict eviction control rules of the
Tenancy Act from 1981. Under this law, landlords may only terminate tenancies for reasonable
grounds dened by law (Bundeskanzleramt 12/1/1981). In general, tenancies in Austria are unlim-
ited in time. However, time limited tenancies are allowed in Austria but since 1993 they have had
to full a minimum duration of three years (Bundeskanzleramt 11/26/1993). Simultaneously, the
rent had to be 25 percent under the comparable rent of a similar dwelling without time limitation.
Thus, they currently do not match the conditions of classic short-term tenancies. Before 1993,
private tenancies had a time limit of one-year maximum. From 1997 to 2000, time limitation was
temporarily raised to ten years (Bundeskanzleramt 12/28/2001).
Canada
In Canada, states are responsible for the regulation of private tenancies. Ontario is the largest
province of Canada's nine provinces in terms of its population. Thus, tenancy law in Ontario
is presented here. Strict private tenancy rules were introduced for the whole country in 1940
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but were abolished soon after the Second World War. At the end of 1960s, the rst Tenancy
Act in Ontario was passed (Supreme Court of Canada, of 5/28/1981; Miron 1995). The new act
only ruled the relation between landlord and tenant. Rents were not touched by that law which
distinctly increased the security of tenure. Landlords were just allowed to evict tenants during
and at the end of a period for special reasons that were dened by law.
In 1975, the Residential Premises Rent Review Act (RPRRA) established a rst-generation
rent control regime in Ontario but some rented dwellings were not covered by this law. It applied
only to rental dwellings in existence prior to 1976. The new act introduced guideline increases for
rents from six to eight percent of the rent per year and also enabled a restricted cost pass-through
(Miron 1995). However, the majority of tenancies fell under a rst rent control regime. In 1979,
the Residential Tenancies Act (RTA) replaced the RPRRA. The new act set guideline rates of
rent increase to a maximum of six percent per year. Tenure security did not change. The rent
guidelines were in force until 1985 when the Residential Rent Regulation Act (RRRA) pushed
the guideline rate to four percent. From 1986 to 1992 rent increases were calculated by a formula
related to changes in costs of maintaining rental buildings called the Residential Complex Cost
Index. Initial rents had to follow a comparable rent that was the upper rent ceiling. With the
RRRA rent regulation rules applied to all rental dwellings irrespective of their construction year
and the amount of rent (Richmond, Stobo 1996; Miron 1995).
In 1992 the Rent Control Act (RCA) came into force. The guideline rates now had to follow
ination rates and average costs. Rent increases were not allowed to overdo these guidelines
by three percentage points. Hence, there was an upper limit on the maximum permitted rent
increase (Richmond, Stobo 1996; Miron 1995). Five years later, the Tenant Protection Act 1997
was passed. It came into force in 1998. The main change to its predecessor was the implementation
of intertenancy decontrol meaning that initial rents were decontrolled while rents during the term
were regulated by guideline increases (Smith 2003). The Residential Tenancies Act 2006 replaced
the Tenant Protection Act 1997 in 2007. Compared to its predecessor, the act set nearly identical
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guidelines for rent increases but did not control the rents for newly made tenancies. The new act
merely focussed on rescheduling the institutional responsibilities. Thus, it replaced the Ontario
Rental Housing Tribunal for the Landlord and Tenant Board to resolve disputes between tenants
and landlords.
Denmark
The regulation of private tenancies in Denmark began with the First World War. Rent control
was relaxed in the aftermath of the war. In the 1930s, however, rent freezes and very high tenure
security were introduced again in the run-up to the Second World War. The rst-generation rent
control regime survived the Second World War. From 1966 to 1974, rental market regulation
was relaxed stepwise. The aim was to lift up rents to market level through xed rent increase
guidelines. However, due to an extraordinary high ination during those years, the real rent level
did not change much (Whitehead et al. 2012; Edlung 2003). At that time most Danish rentals
were regulated by the principles of rent determination from 1939 and their amendments (such as
the one from 1966). Under this regime, rents followed the value of the rented property. According
to the law, rents could not be higher than the rent for a comparable letting. If the rent was
remarkably lower than the comparable rent landlords were allowed to raise the rent to this upper
rent ceiling (Whitehead et al. 2012; Edlung 2003).
In 1975 the Danish government passed a new law introducing new principles of rent control
(Boligreguleringsloven). This law is still the most applied regulation for private tenancies in
Denmark holding in municipalities with a population of more than 20,000 inhabitants. Other
municipalities can choose between the former regulation named Lejeloven and the updated rent
regulation. Under the law, initial rents are restricted by a cost-of-the-dwelling system. During the
tenancy, however, landlords are allowed to pass cost increases on to the tenant. Furthermore, rents
have to be similar within the same apartment building. Stepped rents have to be dened in the
contract. That kind of rent adjustment is only allowed if the initial rent is below the cost-based
rent level, however (Whitehead et al. 2012). Tenure security remained high under the new law.
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Landlords need special reasons dened by law in order to evict the tenant. Short term tenancies
are allowed if they last less than two years and end automatically (Scanlon, Kochan 2011).
In 1991, a tenancy law was passed introducing new construction decontrol in Denmark. Ac-
cording to the new act, the rents for private dwellings built after 1991 were decontrolled. Rent
increases were limited however to the ination rate or to annual step-by-step increases (trappeleje)
that had to be predened in the rental contract. In 2004, rents for rooftop dwellings were also
deregulated (Whitehead et al. 2012; Edlung 2003). Due to a low post-1991 housing stock, the
minority of rented Danish dwellings is currently ruled by this law. The most important system is
rather the cost-based rent control system followed by the value-based system (OECD 2006).
United Kingdom
Tenancy law diers in England/Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Since England and
Wales constitute by far the largest part of the United Kingdom, tenancy law in England is de-
scribed here. In England tenancy regulation has undergone a strong transformation process in
the past fty years. The transformation from a highly regulated private tenancy market to the
weakly regulated one that it is today began in the 1950s when tenancies with rents above a certain
level were deregulated (Hubert 2003). In 1965, a new tenancy law reinvented the regulation of all
private tenancies. The basis for all tenancies was from now on the `fair rent' system. These fair
rents stayed more or less unchanged and did not match the level of market rents (Hubert 2003).
Tenancies were unlimited in time and tenure security was high. Evictions during and at the end
of the term without special reasons were not allowed.
The Housing Act 1980 introduced new forms of regulation and terminated the few remaining
controlled tenancies dating back to the 1950s. At that time, the most relevant form of renting was
the Regulated tenancy. Rents of Regulated tenancies followed a \fair rent" system (Department
for Communities and Local Government 2009b). Tenants enjoyed eviction protection during and
at the end of the period or term. Furthermore, the new law allowed the so-called Shorthold
that allowed rent contracts to be limited in time (Holmans 2005). Another new tenancy form,
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the Assured tenancy, applied only to new and renovated dwellings that were in possession of
organizations accepted by the Secretary of State for the Environment and, therefore, just played
a negligible role (Stephens 2005).
With the Housing Act of 1988 and 1996, English tenancy law has undergone a severe change.
Two new forms of tenancy were introduced which are still in eect: the new Assured tenancy and
the Assured Shorthold tenancy. The market power of landlords in England has been tremendously
strengthened wiht these acts. Most tenants are no longer able to exercise their rights properly
(Cowan, Laurie E. 2005). Before the Housing Act of 1996 , every tenancy had automatically been
an Assured tenancy, unless it was agreed upon that it was not. Under the new act, new tenan-
cies automatically become an Assured Shorthold unless it is contracted otherwise (Department
for Communities and Local Government 2009a). Nevertheless, Assured Shortholds have quickly
become the most common tenancy in England after 1988.
With Assured Shortholds, landlords possess the most power that English tenancy law oers.
Tenure security is low since landlords may evict tenants without giving reasons at the end of the
contract period. Yet, during the tenancy period tenants enjoy severe tenure security (Department
for Communities and Local Government 2009a). Assured tenancies, in comparison, oer tenants
much more security since these contracts are usually unlimited in time. Here, the landlord can
only regain possession of the dwelling for reasonable reasons that are dened in law (Department
for Communities and Local Government 2009a). Initial rents may be negotiated freely for both
Assured tenancies and Assured Shorthold tenancies (Cowan, Laurie E. 2005). During the tenancy,
rent increases have to be orientated to the fair rent level which consists of a system of comparable
rents. Tenants may apply to a rent assessment centre if they think the rent adjustments are set
too high. However, under Assured Shortholds tenants cannot exercise these rights properly due
to a signicant lack of tenure security at the end of the term of the tenancy.
Finland
Due to an economic downturn in the late 1960s, the Finish government strengthened tenure
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security in 1970 and installed a system of rent regulation in 1974 (Johannsson 1998). The new
rent law replaced a system of strict rent control. At that period Finish tenancy law was quite
regulated and tenants enjoyed a high degree of tenure security. Landlords were only allowed to
evict tenants for reasonable reasons that were dened by law (Ralli 2005; Johannsson 1998). Under
this system, the landlord was allowed to increase the rent according to guidelines that were dened
by a council of ministers that involved tenants' and landlords' representatives. In practice, the
annually updated rent standards did not match increases in costs of the dwelling not to mention
market rents.
From the 1980s onwards a couple of new tenancy acts changed the relationship of tenants
and landlords signicantly. First, a new tenancy act was passed in 1987 after twelve years of
preparation (Ralli 2005). Under the new law tenure security decreased marginally. Landlords were
provided with more reasonable grounds to evict tenants (Ministry of the Environment 7/10/1987).
Rents had to be reasonable and in compliance with the average rent of the area surrounding the
dwelling. The act aimed at implementing a reasonable prot for landlords when letting the at to
a tenant (Ministry of the Environment 7/10/1987; Ralli 2005). During those years, rent increases
became easier for landlords though it still remained dicult for landlords to adjust rents. Overall,
rents failed to match market rents.
In the early 1990s, the nish tenancy market was tremendously deregulated. It started with the
exemption from rent regulation for buildings built after the 1990 for rural areas. It was extended
to all contracts signed on or after February 1st, 1992 everywhere in the country, regardless of
the age of the dwelling. In 1995, the parliament passed a new law that made the deregulated
rent system the sole system for the whole country. Under the new law, which is still in eect,
the dierent parties are able to freely negotiate rents at the beginning and during the tenancy.
Thus, a free rent regime is currently in use in Finland. However, rents may not be immorally
decoupled from rents of similar dwellings in the surrounding area (Ministry of the Environment
3/31/1995). Tenure security is low in Finland. Landlords are free to give notice whenever they
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want. Reasonable reasons are needed for the eviction of a tenant but the term \reasonable" is
not dened by law. Rent increases during the term are seen as a reasonable ground. Solely, social
aspects may play a substantial role at the eviction process at court (Ministry of the Environment
3/31/1995; Ralli 2005). Fixed term tenancies end without any notice at the end of the agreed
rent-period (Johannsson 1998). Finland is currently one of the most deregulated private tenancy
markets in Europe (Lyytikainen 2006; Ralli 2005).
France
France introduced a strict rent freeze system in the Second World War which in contrast to
many other countries did not last long. At the end of the 1940s, French authorities relaxed the
regulations of tenancy contracts. Smaller communes were deregulated while only tenancies in
larger communes were controlled. In the following decades, the number of tenancy controlled
communes steadily shrank. In the mid-1970s, only a minority of private tenancies was regulated.
In 1976, France installed a strict nominal rent freeze system to ght high consumer price ination
(Hubert 2003).
In 1982, a system of strict tenancy regulation was established by the law Quillot. The primary
goal of the new law was to control rent ination (Boccadoro, Chamboredon 2005). The Quillot
law covered all tenancies for residential living purposes. The new law explicitly favoured the
tenant as a reaction to the lack of available lodging and the resulting power of the landlords.
The basic elements of the new law were minimum terms of six years only binding for landlords,
limited conditions of termination by landlords and strict rent regulations. Rents had to follow
guidelines published by the housing association. The government even had the right to suspend
rent adjustment throughout the whole country. Rents for newly constructed rentals, in contrast,
could be freely negotiated between tenants and landlords (Moor 1983).
In 1986, the newly-elected Conservative government passed a law that aimed at encouraging
landlords to rent out their apartments again (Boccadoro, Chamboredon 2005). The Mehaignerie
Act enabled landlords to easily evict tenants after a guaranteed three-year-duration of the tenancy
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(Law n. 86-1290, xx 9{10). Furthermore, the act allowed an unrestricted negotiation of initial
rents (Satsangi 1998). However, rent adjustment by more than the change of the construction
index was not allowed during the there-year-period (Law n. 86-1290, x 15). Despite the newly-
gained freedom and power for landlords, tenants still enjoyed high standards of security during
the three-years-term.
Only three years later, in 1989, the Mermaz Act was passed. It was a result of a consensus
between the dierent political parties and undid some of the deregulation of the Mehaignerie Act.
A minimum term of three years retained. However, the landlord's right to easily evict the tenant
after the end of the minimum term was repealed. Initial rents could still be freely negotiated but
yearly rent increases could not be higher than the French construction cost index and had to be
mentioned in the contract. Furthermore rents may be increased in reference to the comparable
rent after the minimum term ended (Law n. 89-462, x 17). Subsequent tenancy acts such as the
ones in 1994 and 1998 did not deeply change the Mermaz Act.
Germany
The basic elements of the current German tenancy law were introduced in the 1970s. The
German tenancy law is written down in the German civil code (BGB 2011). At that time, the
tenant's security issues were strengthened particularly by two laws { the rst and second Wohn-
raumkundigungsschutzgesetz (WKSchG). Furthermore, new rent control rules were enacted at that
period (Haublein, Lehmann-Richter 2009). With the Rent Control Act of 1974 (Miethohegesetz -
MHRG) the rules for rent increases were dened (Wurmnest 2005). Yet there were always spatially
and/or timely restricted exemptions by law such as the stricter rent control laws in West-Berlin
before 1990 or the new rent control law (Mietpreisbremse) from 2015 that can be spatially eective
for areas with housing shortages.
Tenants enjoy high standards of security in German tenancy law. Due to the mentioned laws
introduced in the 1970s, landlords are seriously restricted in giving notice. Since then, there
have not been any essential changes in law as to the security of tenants. In general, the landlord
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may only evict the tenant for special reasonable grounds that are dened by law. Furthermore,
evictions as a result of unjustied rent increases are not possible (Haublein, Lehmann-Richter
2009). Contracts limited in time are treated similarly. According to the German Civil Code
contracts limited in time can be terminated only under special circumstances at the end of the
rent period (BGB 2011, x 575). The basic rules in German tenancy law for contracts limited
in time were introduced in 1982 (Kohler 1983). German rent regulation is based upon several
dierent types of rent regulation and oers rent exibility in a moderate way. Generally, rent
regulation refers to rent increases. The primal rent negotiation can be conducted without any
restriction. There are exceptions, however, if there is a limited oer of dwellings, the landlord
may not demand unreasonable rents (BGB 2011, x 558) or if initial rents are restricted by law for
certain years for a special region (Mietpreisbremse).
Rent increases during the term are regulated, there exist three dierent forms. First rents
may be increased up to an upper ceiling that is the comparable rent. However, the rent may
not be increased by more than 20 % within three years (BGB 2011, x 558). This rule was
implemented in 1982 and was modied several times (Kohler 1983). Secondly, the stepped rent
increase (Staelmiete) was implemented in 1982. Here, landlord and tenant may contractually
agree upon several prospective rent increases (BGB 2011, x 557). An upper limit does not hold for
this kind of rent increases (Rebmann et al. 2008). Yet, immorally high rents are still forbidden.
Thirdly, index-claused increases are allowed in Germany to an ocial cost of living index (BGB
2011, x 557).
Ireland
From the early 1980s until 2004 the majority of Irish tenants did not enjoy any kind of long-
or medium term security of tenure and rents. Before tenancies had been regulated by the Tenancy
Act 1960 and 1967. However, not all tenancies were covered by this very strict and complicated
rent and eviction control law (Ryall 2005). With the beginning of the 1980s, the Irish Supreme
Court declared the Rent Restrictions Acts of the 1960s an \unjust attack" on landlords' property
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rights (Ryall 2005). In the aftermath, the rst-generation rent control regime expired and a free
rent regime became dominant. Until the beginning of the 1990s there was no signicant change
in tenancy law in Ireland.
The Housing (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act from 1992 did not change the proportion of power
among tenants and landlords in Ireland, it just introduced some minimum standards. The free rent
regime was still in force and landlords could easily give notice (Government of Ireland 7/23/1992,
xx 16{18). There existed two main forms of residential tenancies: xed term and periodic tenancies.
Under the law of 1992, both forms were subject to free market rents. As for periodic tenancies,
landlords were able to raise rents without any reason if they wanted to. In case the tenant did
not accept the rent increase, the landlord was allowed to evict them. Thus, the landlord could x
the rent without restriction. Under a xed term tenancy, stipulated rents were immutable for the
duration of the tenancy. Once the term of the tenancy had ended, however, the landlord was able
to increase the rent for a new xed term tenancy. If the contract period expired, the landlord was
not obliged to renew the contract (Ryall 2005).
In 2004, the Irish law enacted a new residential tenancy act. It was the most important change
in private tenancy law in decades. Today, it is the basic principle of the Irish tenancy law (Norris
2011). This Residential Tenancy Act increased the tenure security for tenants signicantly. The
new legal framework covers both, a periodic and a xed term tenancy (Ryall 2006). According to
the new law, initial rents and any subsequent rent adjustments may not be higher than the \market
rent" that is dened as the rent that landlords are willing to get and the tenants are willing to pay
in regard to other comparable dwellings (Ryall 2006). The most important improvement in terms
of the security of tenancies is that tenants enter a statutory tenancy of three and a half years once
they have successfully passed six months of continuous occupation of the implied dwelling. In the
rst six months of a tenancy, landlords are allowed to evict the tenant without giving reasons.
The tenant can enter a new four-years-tenancy only if the landlord does not give notice before
the end of the rst four-years-tenancy. Then, a new probationary period of six months starts. In
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case of statutory protection the landlord may terminate the tenancy only on reasonable grounds
(Ryall 2006; Norris 2011; Irish Government 7/19/2004).
Italy
After the strict rent control regime during the First World War regulation of tenancies enjoyed
a revival in the 1920s. At that time, a rst-generation rent control regime was installed. In the
upcoming decades several amendments were made. From the Second World War until the end of
the 1970s rents were strictly controlled in Italy. In addition, special acts made the termination
of rental contracts for landlords nearly impossible (Breccia, Bargelli 2005). According to this
restrictive regulation regime, tenancy contracts were automatically renewed (Bianchi 2014). Hence
landlords were not able to repossess their rented dwellings or rent their property for a protable
rate of return. Rents led to match market rents. In these decades, the system of tenancy
regulation in Italy equalled a rst-generation rent control regime.
The steadily growing public criticism of the predominant tenancy regulation regime culminated
in a new tenancy act in 1978 (Law n. 392/1978). The new act represented the rst complete set
of rules for the regulation of tenancies. Tenants kept the high standard of tenure and rent security
and the duration of tenancy was strictly xed (Bianchi 2014). Rents were determined by a fair rent
system that followed the regime of comparable rents with xed upper ceilings (Law n. 392/1978,
x 12). Under the law of 1978, tenancies had to last for at least four years (Law n. 392/1978, x 1).
Landlords could not evict tenants without giving special reasons that were dened by law (Law
n. 392/1978, x 59). However, contracts automatically end at the end of the minimum duration
term (Breccia, Bargelli 2005). In 1992, rent regulation was relaxed by a new act. Under the new
statute (Law n. 359/1992) newly built dwellings were excluded from the current rent regulation
regime.
In 1998, the current system of rent regulation was established. Under the new act (Law n.
431/1998) most principles of the former Fair Rent Act were substituted by new rules. Thus,
initial rents may be negotiated freely between landlord and tenants for ordinary tenancies. That
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holds even for rent adjustments during the contract period (Law n. 431/1998, x 13). Hence, a
free rent regime was established for the majority of tenancies in Italy. Yet, the rents for a special
form of private tenancies are heavily regulated, namely dwellings that are supported by the Italian
government. Here, rents have an upper limit that is determined by tenant and landlord associations
(Breccia, Bargelli 2005). Tenure security is very high under the new act for all tenancies. Minimum
terms of four years with strict eviction rules are stipulated by law. These rules hold also at the
end of the term. Landlords are only allowed to evict tenants by giving special reasons that are
dened by law (Breccia, Bargelli 2005).
Netherlands
Rental market regulation was well developed in the aftermath of the Second World War and
tenants in the Netherlands were given much power. At that time, it was nearly impossible for
landlords to evict a tenant and rents were raised and lowered by the Dutch government. In the
1960s rent control was slightly relaxed. In the 1970s a tremendous political ght began between
advocates of a more liberalized and defenders of a regulated private rental market. In the end, the
proponents of a generally regulated rental market came o as the winners. The oil crisis and its
massive economic burden for the Dutch economy may have fostered the mentioned development in
the Netherlands (Jan van der Schaar 1987). In 1979, the old tenancy law called \Woonruimtewet"
was replaced by a new law named \Huurprijzenwet". The introduction of the \Huurprijzenwet"
resolved the confusing state of tenancy law at that time and Dutch tenancy contracts maintained
regulated (Adriaansens, Fortgens 1990).
According to the Housing Act of 1979, tenants enjoy high protection against eviction by the
landlord. Landlords may give notice only under special circumstances which are dened by law.
Dutch tenancy law does accept short-termed tenancies. However, an eviction of the tenant at
the end of the contract is only lawful in case of personal need by the landlord. Otherwise time
limited contracts automatically convert into unlimited contracts (Adriaansens, Fortgens 1990;
Rueb, Kaufmann 2005). Rents can be freely negotiated between landlords and tenants. However,
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the rents have to be in line with the point-system that is linked to the quality of the dwelling.
According to that point system, every apartment has a maximum rent that can be charged. The
rent regime works like a comparable rent system that is updated once a year. If the rent seems
to be too high for the tenant, they may raise a complaint at the \huurcommissie", which lowers
the rent if the rent cannot be justied by the points. The \huurcommissie" can be considered a
rent tribunal (Adriaansens, Fortgens 1990; Haner 2011). In 1994 rent became decontrolled for
dwellings of higher standards (European Central Bank 2003). Rent increases are possible only
once a year for both liberalized and non-liberalized dwellings. Although there was a change in
housing law in 2003, rent regulation and tenure security remained more or less unchanged. The
new law of 2003 just incorporated the rules about maximum rents into the Dutch Civil Code
(Rueb, Kauf-mann 2005).
New Zealand
Private residential markets were highly regulated in the aftermath of the Second World War.
An important milestone in the post war era was the Tenancy Act of 1955 (New Zealand Parliament
10/21/1955). It established a signicant rent and eviction control regime for private tenancies.
Rents had to follow the principles of fair rents and were xed by a rent ocer (New Zealand
Parliament 10/21/1955, xx 18{19). The method of xing the rent was dened by law (New Zealand
Parliament 10/21/1955, xx 20{23). The Tenancy Act 1955 did also address the relation between
landlords and tenants: landlords were not allowed to evict tenants without giving reasons that
were dened by law; both at the end of and during a term (New Zealand Parliament 10/21/1955,
x 36). However, rental dwellings that were constructed after 1955 were excluded from the Tenancy
Act of 1955 (New Zealand Parliament 10/21/1955, x 6). In the following three decades, the act
was amended several times and minor changes were made. Yet, in 1973 the Rent Appeal Act was
passed which applied to all those dwellings that had not been addressed by the Tenancy Act of
1955 (New Zealand Parliament 10/2/1973, xx 29{30). It introduced the principles of the equitable
rent: Rent Appeal Boards were enabled to assess and x the equitable rent of the mentioned
58
premises (New Zealand Parliament 10/2/1973, x 6). The equitable rent worked like a comparable
rent regime. Rent increases were generously cut to a maximum of 15 percent per year (New
Zealand Parliament 10/2/1973, x 8).
After some minor amendments of the current tenancy law private rental market regulation was
signicantly changed under the Residential Tenancies Act of 1986. It currently holds for the great
majority of all rented dwellings. Rents are free to be negotiated under the Residential Tenancies
Act. Nevertheless tenants may claim excessive rent increases at Tenancy Tribunals for rental
assessment (New Zealand Parliament 12/17/1986, xx 23{24). According to the act tenancies can
be either a short-term or periodic tenancy. Landlords are allowed to evict tenants only for special
reasons dened by law (New Zealand Parliament 12/17/1986, xx 50{55). However, tenancies
automatically end at the end of a xed or periodic term of a tenancy. Periodic tenancies just
renew automatically after a special period if no party give notice. Fixed short-term tenancies end
automatically at the end of the term. There were several minor amendments to this act in 1992,
1996 and 2010 that did not crucially change the regulation of private tenancies in New Zealand.
Norway
The regulation of private tenancies started during the First World War. In the aftermath of
the war rents remained strictly controlled. Passing the Landlord and Tenant Act a softer rent
and eviction control regime was introduced in Norway. At that time housing committees were
enabled to determine guidelines for rent increases. Often, rent increases more or less equalled
the Norwegian ination rate. Rent adjustments due to renovation work and other improvements
were allowed (Whitehead et al. 2012; Lilleholt 2014). Newly built rental dwellings were exempted
from rent control. Although there were several amendments to rental market regulation in the
years after the Second World War the old control regime was in force in Oslo and Trondheim until
the end of the century. In 1982, the number of municipalities that had strict rent restrictions for
buildings built before 1940 was reduced from ten to three (Oslo, Trondheim and Bergen). After
that, the rent for the majority of rented dwellings was unregulated (Langsether, Medby 2005).
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In 1999 a new Landlord and Tenant Act was passed by the Norwegian government. The new
act abolished the old regulations of tenancies. Initial rents were and are still allowed to be set
freely by tenants and landlords. Rent increases, however, are index-linked. They have to follow
the ocial retail price index in Norway. As in most other countries of the sample, unmorally
high rents in relation to the mean rent for similar dwellings are forbidden in Norway. Greater
rent increases than the annual growth rate of the retail price index are allowed every three years
in order to match comparable market rents (Whitehead et al. 2012). In 2010, Oslo as the last
Norwegian city removed the control of pre-war rental stock (Whitehead et al. 2012). The security
of tenure underwent some changes, too. Landlords may not evict without giving special reasons
dened by law. However, these eviction rules just hold during the term of a tenancy. Landlords
are allowed to get easily repossession of the rented dwelling at the end of a time limited tenancy
without giving special reasons. Yet, time limited tenancies have to last at least three years which
means that classical short term tenancies - as dened in chapter 2 - are not allowed in Norway
(Whitehead et al. 2012; Lilleholt 2014).
Spain
In the aftermath of the Spanish Civil War, there were several updates in Spanish tenancy
law. The tenancy market was strictly regulated in those years. The government introduced a new
tenancy law in 1964 that dominated the Spanish rental market until the 1980s (Mora Sanguinetti
2010). Under the jurisdiction of the Urban Tenancy Act 1964, tenure security was very high.
Landlords had no real chance of repossessing their dwellings while tenants were able to renew
their tenancy contracts as often as they wanted, if they reliably paid the rent. Under special
circumstances tenants could pass on the right of living in the dwelling. Rent adjustments were
hard to achieve for landlords. Even though limited rent increases were possible, the range for
rent increases was low. Thus, rents were below true market level. Yet, there was the possibility
to increase the rent after the initial ve years of the contract (Blas Lopez 2005; Ministerio De
Justicia 12/24/1964; Mora Sanguinetti 2010).
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In the 1980s, the Spanish government aimed at revitalizing the tenancy market, hence im-
plementing the Boyer Decree in 1985. The Boyer Decree was designed to liberalize the Spanish
tenancy market (Blas Lopez 2005). There were three main changes: First, landlords were now
allowed to transform private tenancies into business leases. Furthermore, the two parties were
free to negotiate the initial rent level. And nally, there was the abolition of the indenite lease
renewal: the two parties were now free to determine the term of the tenancy (Jefatura des Estado
4/30/1985, xx 7{11; Blas Lopez 2005). Thus, the Boyer decree allowed short term contracts.
However, rents in Spain were still linked to the Spanish consumer price index and the new law
was only applicable for contracts that were signed after the implementation of the decree.
In 1994, the government introduced a new tenancy act. The Urban Tenancy Act 1994 (Jefatura
del Estado 11/24/1994) revisited the idea of blocked rents and lease renewals. The act implemented
a minimum term of ve years for every tenancy. Even if the two parties agreed on a tenancy lasting
less, the tenant could prolong it to a ve-year contract. There was only little room for exceptions.
Once the minimum term was over, the tenant was able to prolong the contract for three more
years up to an all in all contract length of eight years (Blas Lopez 2005). According to the Urban
Tenancy Act 1994, landlords and tenants were free to determine the initial rent. In the rst ve
years of the tenancy, rents could only get raised once a year. During that period, the rent increase
could not be higher than the annual growth rate of the consumer price index. Afterwards, the
amount of rent could be modied according to what the parties agreed upon but the raise could
not be more than 20 % of the original rent (Blas Lopez 2005; Jefatura del Estado 11/24/1994, xx
17{20).
In 2013 the Spanish government updated rental market regulation in Spain. The aim of the
new regulation was to liberalize the up to then deeply regulated tenancy market. According to
the Act on Flexibilization and Promotion of the Rental Housing Market (Jefatura del Estado
6/4/2013) the minimum duration for private tenancies was reduced from ve to three years and
its extension from three to one year. Furthermore, rent increases for new leases are now to be
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freely determined in the contract. The rent increases need not be bound to the to the consumer
price index anymore (Cuerpo et al. 2014).
Sweden
Sweden's tenancy law has not undergone severe changes in the past fty years. The general
act of Swedish tenancy law was introduced into the Land Code in 1970 (Justitiedepartementet
1970). The relevant part for rent issues is chapter twelve of the Land Code (\Hyra"). Since 1970,
there have been constant but minor changes in the private tenancy law (Jensen 2005). In Swedish
law, the tenant enjoys an extensive protection and landlords may terminate the tenancy under
special circumstances that are dened by law (Justitiedepartementet 1970, xx 42{55). In general,
the landlord has to le a suit in the District Court to remove the tenant. Furthermore, the tenant
may lose their right of prolongation of the contract if the mutual trust between the two parties has
been eroded, for example by repeatedly delayed rent payments or other defaults of the contract by
the tenant. Apart from that, it is nearly impossible for the landlord to evict a tenant out of their
rented property. The tenant may even sublet the rented dwelling in case of a temporary absence.
Furthermore, there is the possibility for tenants to swap dwellings with each other. Short term
tenancies cannot be enforced (Jensen 2005; Johannsson 1998).
The basis of the Swedish rent regulation is the Principle of User Value (\bruksvardesprin-
cipen"). It means that rental dwellings with the same utility value should have the same rent.
Thus, rents must not be higher than the average rent for a dwelling that is comparable in terms
of condition, size and location. If a rent exceeds the rate, tenants have the right to lower the
rent through court or Rent Tribunal decision. The rent level is determined by the Associations
of Landlords and Tenants. The comparative amount of fair rent is calculated with rents for
dwellings owned by municipal housing companies (Jensen 2005). Thus, rents are determined by
governmental institutions rather than by market developments.
A new law was introduced by the Conservative government in 2011 and changed the way
comparative rents were calculated. It is widely considered an important step towards market
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rents since before the comparable rent used to be determined by the Association of Landlords
and Tenants more or less freely. The changes were outlined in a government declaration of 2010
(Regeringens proposition 2009/10:185). According to the new law, rents for municipal dwellings
are no central landmark for fair rents in Sweden anymore. The utility value of a dwelling is
now determined by collectively bargained rents, irrespective of whether the owner is a municipal
housing company or a private landlord. Furthermore, the new law declares that rent levels that
are considerably below the new comparable rates of dwellings can be adjusted (Socialministerum
3/4/2011).
Switzerland
The Swiss Code of Obligations (SCO) integrated tenancy law in 1881. Under this law, private
tenancies the legal contract standard, the termination of tenancies and the responsibilities of
landlords and tenants were ruled. However, a deep regulation of rents and high standards of
tenure security were nonexistent. In 1911, a revision led only to minor changes. The rules of 1911
in the SCO were not changed until 1970. Yet, several temporary emergency decrees were enacted
in the years between 1911 and 1970 leading to a system of controlled rents and higher tenure
security. Therefore, the SCO was in force just in the periods of 1912 to 1914 and 1926 to 1936. In
the meantime emergency laws and decrees modied the fundamental tenancy law of the SCO. In
1970 any tenancy regulation in Switzerland was abolished. Thus, until 1972 no regulatory rules
for private tenancies - except the mentioned rules in the civil code - existed. In those years , there
existed no consequent rent regulation (Rohrbach 2012; Furrer, Vasella 2005).
In 1972, a new act (Bundesrat 6/2/1972) was enacted to strengthen tenants' rights in Switzer-
land. Its main goal was to prevent malpractices in the private rental market. Therefore, a fair
rent system was established. Swiss tenancy law had the aim of ghting abusively high rents.
Rents had to orientate at the local reference rent (Bundesrat 6/2/1972, xx 14{15). Thus, rent
regulation in Switzerland followed the principle of comparable rents. Furthermore, index-linked
rent increases and stepped rents were allowed since they followed the principles of fair rents (Bun-
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desrat 6/2/1972, xx 11{12). In addition, the security of tenure was enhanced. Landlords were not
allowed to terminate a tenancy without having special reasons dened by law. Tenancies limited
in time ended automatically at the end of the term. However, these measures were only applicable
in regions with housing shortages. This was changed after long political debates in 1986. The act
was adopted in 1987. Since then, the regulation holds for the whole Switzerland irrespective of
housing shortages (Furrer, Vasella 2005; Rohrbach 2012).
In 1990 another great revision of private tenancy law took place when the former rules were
integrated into the SCO (Huguenin, Arnold 2014, x 253). Substantial changes of private tenancy
law, however, did not occur (Rohrbach 2012) and there were no signicant changes of tenancy
regulation. Swiss rent regulation still follows a system of fair rents. As for the security of tenure,
the landlord may only give notice for several valid reasons such as non-payment of rents. Tenancies
limited in time ends at the end of the period without the landlord having to give reasons.
United States
In contrast to European countries there is not such a rich tradition of regulation of private
tenancy markets in the United States. However, there were times when private tenancies were
strictly regulated nationwide. Especially during the Second World War private tenancies were
controlled massively as a measure of national emergency. In the aftermath of the war the relaxation
of housing shortages through construction lead to an abolishment of tenancy market regulation
in the 1950s. Some cities like New York City almost maintained regulating private tenancies
(Gilderbloom, Ye 2007; Autor et al. 2014).
In the 1970s a movement towards tenancy regulation emerged in several parts of the United
States. The foremost strict rent control regimes were merely restricted to separate municipalities.
In those years rent control laws had been enacted in over 170 municipalities, especially in the
Northeast of the country and California (Keating, Kahn 2001). Most parts of the country's
private residential rent market stayed, however, unregulated. Even during the peak of regulation
in the 1970s only a minority of rented dwellings in the United States were regulated by a special
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rent controlling law. The amount of controlled dwellings shrunk in the following decades due to a
countermovement towards less regulated markets. Tenure security stayed low as in most parts of
the United States (Dreier 1982). In the following, the regulation of rents and tenure security for
California as the largest state and Massachusetts as an exemplary state in the northeast of the
country will be analysed as a proxy for tenancy market regulation in the United States.
In California, rental market regulation came up during the 1970s when new construction was
low and rents were constantly high. Several cities implemented rent regulating rules in the sec-
ond half of the 1970s. Los Angeles - the largest city in California - introduced rent control in
1979. First, rents were frozen to their 1978 level for six months. After that, rent increases were
limited to a yearly growth rate of 7.6 percent. In 1982, the growth rate was dropped to around
5 percent. However, several exceptions were installed such as vacancies decontrol or single-family
house decontrol (Dreier 5/24/1997; Murray et al. 1988). Due to vacancy decontrol the fraction
of controlled dwellings in Los Angeles constantly shrank in the following decades. In the rest
of California rent regulation was installed in several municipalities at the end of the 1970s. But
a trend of deregulation started in the late 1980s in California. New laws such as the Ellis Act
from 1985 weakened the position of tenants in controlled dwellings. Nevertheless, the rent control
system may have ocially ended in 1995 when the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act became
law. The bill permits all cities to decontrol vacant dwellings. Under this act all the predominance
of the strict rent control regimes in several municipalities in California (e.g. West-Hollywood or
Berkeley) nally came to an end. As mentioned before, however, the decline of strict rent con-
trolling regimes had already started in the 1980s in California (Dreier 5/24/1997; Keating, Kahn
2001).
Until today, tenure security for controlled dwellings has been high. Several reasons dened by
law have to be fullled in order to evict a tenant at the end and during the period of payment.
But for uncontrolled tenancies tenure security has been low. For those tenancies, durations on
average are low since landlords just oer short time limited tenancies in order to avoid eviction
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restrictions (Genesove 2003). If possible, landlords widely oer only those time limited tenancies
in California and the whole of the USA. Today, this is by far the most common tenancy form in
California. Landlords are not allowed to evict tenants without giving special reasons dened by
law during the term of the tenancy but can do so at the end of the agreed term without giving
reasons.
In Massachusetts rent control regimes were less robust and developed than in California. Here,
rent control regimes were only in action in Boston, Cambridge and Brookline by 1979 and hence
not as widespread as in California. As a consequence, rental market regulation did not play
such a dominant role on the state-level in Massachusetts as in California. In Cambridge, the
strictest rent control regime was implemented starting in 1970. The control regime was made up
of tight rent level and rent increase ceilings. Furthermore, the transformation of rented dwellings
to condominiums was restricted. However, newly constructed buildings were exempted from this
rule in Cambridge (Dreier 5/24/1997; Autor et al. 2014). The Cambridge Rent Control Board
limited rent increases for controlled dwellings in the late 1980s to 0.85 percent of the growth of
consumption price ination (Sims 2011). In Boston, a strict regulation of private tenancy was
implemented in 1970 as well. However in 1975 a law was passed that deregulated controlled
dwellings becoming vacant. Thus, the number of controlled rented dwellings shrank stepwise from
100.000 to 35.000 in 1983 (Dreier 5/24/1997). The rent decontrolled sector was regulated by a
rent grievance system against excessive rent increases. In 1995, under the so-called question-9
campaign any form of rent control was abandoned in Massachusetts after a state referendum even
though the fraction of controlled private tenancies was already low in 1995. In fact, less than 5
percent of all rented dwellings were controlled at that time (Dreier 5/24/1997). Today, regulation
of tenancies is nearly non-existent in Massachusetts. Tenure security is therefore low and just
guaranteed during the term of the tenancy.
66
5.2 Rent Control Regimes
Figure 5: The Rent Control Regimes
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5.3 Robustness Analysis
Figure 6: Robustness Check with Extra Variables
Note: The rent control regimes are discrete variables euqal to one if the respective criterions are
fulllled. Robust standard errors and clustered standard errors are in parantheses. The dependent variable
is the real rent growth rate. The models A1-A3 check for further control variables such as the year-on-year
real house price growth rate and the year-on-year population growth rate. The models A4-A6 check for a
smaller country sample where common law countries are excluded.
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Figure 7: Robustness Check 2
Note: The rent control regimes are discrete variables equal to one if the respective criterions are
fulllled. Robust standard errors and clustered standard errors are in parantheses. The dependent variable
is the real rent growth rate. The models A7-A9 check for a smaller country sample where French law
countries are excluded. The models A10-A12 check for a country sample where the Scandinavian legal
origin countries are excluded.
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Figure 8: Robustness with Hausmann Test
Note: The rent control regimes are discrete variables equal to one if the respective criterions are
fulllled. Simple, robust and clustered standard errors are in parantheses. The dependent variable is the
real rent growth rate. The models A13-A15 covers the estimations for a panel where german legal origin
countries are excluded. The models A16 and A17 shows the Hausman test analysis. A16 and A17 are
estimated with the Stata command xtreg as specied in Stata.
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Figure 9: Robustness Check with Other Starting Year
Note: The rent control regimes are discrete variables euqal to one if the respective criterions are
fulllled. Robust standard errors and clustered standard errors are in parantheses. The dependent variable
is the real rent growth rate. The models A18-A20 covers the estimations for a panel that starts in 1979.
The models A21-A23 shows the estimations results for a panel that end already in 2008
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